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to Automobile Search and Seizure Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Frankfurter once observed, "The course of true law pertaining to
searches and seizures ... has not-to put it mildly-run smooth."' Within
the more limited context of automobile searches this observation is especially
appropriate. Although police face the practical application of fourth amend-
ment 2 protections daily, the United States Supreme Court has yet to articu-
late a cohesive analytical approach to search and seizure.
The diversity of approaches asserted in the Court's two most recent
decisions, United States v. Ross3 and New York v. Belton,4 exemplifies the
lack of coherence in search and seizure.5 However, "It is true also of jour-
neys in the law that the place you reach depends on the direction you are
taking. And so, where one comes out in a case depends on where one goes
in.''6 Similarly, the degree of coherence in the Supreme Court's approach to
automobile search and seizure cases depends on the perceived analytical
framework. Since the Court often has stated that warrantless searches are
"per se unreasonable ' 7 and that the exceptions to the warrant requirement
are "jealously and carefully drawn," 8 it would be logical to assume that the
Court brings a warrant-preference approach 9 to automobile search and
seizure cases. Under that approach, however, the course of the law indeed
has "not. . . run smooth." ' 0
It is possible, however, that the Court implicitly has addressed auto-
mobile search and seizure cases with an analytical framework other than a
warrant-preference approach; that is, under certain unarticulated principles,
perhaps the Court has resolved these cases in a more coherent fashion. The
1. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1%1) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The fourth amendment has been made fully applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For the Supreme Court's interpretation of various aspects of the fourth amendment's
freedoms, see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See generally
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978); T. TAYLOR, TWO
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
3. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
4. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 12-53.
6. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950).
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
8. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
10. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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implicit analytical framework may signal a movement away from the asserted
warrant-preference approach toward a functional theory" of fourth amend-
ment principles for automobile searches. This Comment will discuss the pos-
sible contours of this automobile search and seizure analytical framework. In
so doing, this Comment will postulate that the course of the law in this area is
smoother than previously thought. Furthermore, this Comment will propose
guidelines for police in this problematical area of search and seizure.
II. RECENT DECISIONS BY THE COURT
In United States v. Ross 12 and New York v. Belton 3 the Supreme Court
recently encountered two opportunities to delineate further the permissible
scope of warrantless automobile searches. Counsel argued Ross 4 and
Belton 15 under different warrant-exception theories. A divided Court' 6 upheld
the search in both Belton 17 and Ross. '
8
In Belton the police stopped the defendant for speeding.' 9 After ap-
proaching the car and asking for a driver's license and auto registration, the
lone officer smelled marijuana. 20 The officer then ordered the defendant and
his three companions out of the car and placed them under arrest for the
unlawful possession of marijuana. 2' After frisking each of the four men and
separating them by positioning each in a different area of the highway, the
officer searched the passenger compartment of the car. Besides finding mari-
juana in an envelope on the floor of the car, the officer found cocaine in a
zipped pocket of the defendant's leather jacket that was on the back seat of
the car.22 The officer then drove the four to a nearby police station. The
defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, but preserved his claim that the
officer had seized the cocaine in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments.23
Ross differed from Belton in that police had been tipped by an informant
that the defendant was selling drugs from the trunk of his car at a specific
location.24 Upon arriving at the scene the police observed an automobile that
matched the description provided by the informant. Because the police did
not see anyone who fit the description given them by the informant, they left
the area. 5 Upon returning a few minutes later the police observed the defend-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 301-07.
12. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
13. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 31-45.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 46-53.
16. Both cases were decided by a vote of 6-3 with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White dissenting.
17. 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
18. 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
19. 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 456.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1982).
25. Id.
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ant driving the suspected automobile. Because the defendant matched the
informant's description, the police stopped him, ordered him out of the car,
handcuffed him, and searched both the interior of the car and its trunk.26 In
the trunk the police found a paper bag concealing a number of glassine bags
containing a white powder, later determined to be heroin.27
Defendant Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute. Prior to trial in the district court, Ross tried unsuccessfully to
suppress the use of the heroin as evidence, arguing that the warrantless search
of the paper bag constituted a violation of his fourth amendment rights.28
After reversal by the court of appeals,29 the Supreme Court considered
whether the warrantless search had been proper.30
Although these two cases factually are similar, they were argued under
different search and seizure theories. In Ross the U.S. Government formu-
lated two basic arguments to uphold the search of the paper bag. First, be-
cause there existed both probable cause31 to believe drugs were in the trunk
and an exigency 32 making it impractical to procure a warrant before searching
the paper bag, the search fell within the automobile exception 33 to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment. Second, because the container was
flimsy, it was subject to a lesser expectation of privacy. 34 Thus, no search in
the constitutional sense had occurred.35
This second argument is predicated on the Court's view that the fourth
amendment protects primarily privacy interests rather than property inter-
ests. In Warden v. Hayden36 the Court stated that "the principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property." 37
In Katz v. United States38 the Court articulated the principle that has
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 31-45.
31. Probable cause has been defined by the Supreme Court as "whether... the facts and circumstances
within [the officer's] knowledge and of which [the officer] had reasonably trustworthy information were suffi-
cient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
32. The Supreme Court has recognized that "the exigencies of the situation" sometimes may create an
exception to the warrant requirement. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). Within the context
of automobile searches, the Court initially determined that the inherent mobility of the automobile itself created
the requisite exigent circumstances to obviate the necessity of obtaining a search warrant when probable cause
to search existed. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). Subsequent decisions that have
expanded the variety of circumstances that can create a warrant-obviating exigency have rendered the original
meaning devoid of content. See infra text accompanying notes 213-17.
33. The expression refers to the permissible scope of a warrantless search when an automobile or other
vehicle is stopped and the police have probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime. See
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979). For a detailed analysis of the birth and development of the
exception, see W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2
(1978).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
35. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2178 n.5 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
37. Id. at 304.
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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become the basic test for determining whether a search in the fourth amend-
ment privacy sense has occurred. In that case the defendant had been con-
victed of violating a federal statute prohibiting interstate gambling. The police
had obtained evidence through the warrantless use of a surveillance device
attached to the public telephone booth that the defendant used to make his
bets.
The Court, in holding -the action of the government unconstitutional,
stated: "The Government's activities in electronically listening to and record-
ing the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ' ' 9
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, gave substance to the phrase
"justifiably relied" by articulating a two-part definition: "My understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 40 This two-part "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test enables a court to determine whether a search has occurred. 4'
The Supreme Court in Ross, while not agreeing with the U.S. Govern-
ment that no search had occurred,42 upheld the search as reasonable because
it had been "no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately
authorize by warrant." 43 The Court further held that if "probable cause justi-
fies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search." 44 The Court did indicate, however, that this rule may not apply
when the locus of probable cause is a particular container rather than the
automobile in general.45
The State of New York relied on the search incident to arrest exception
in its successful effort to justify the search of the defendant's jacket in New
York v. Belton.4 6 Under the modern definition of this exception to the warrant
requirement,47 the arresting officer, to protect himself and to prevent the
39. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 361.
41. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The
second part of this test-whether the expectation of privacy is reasonable-has caused considerable difficulty in
the courts. Opinions have been varied and diverse on the question whether different containers manifest a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See infra note 132.
42. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1982). The idea that a constitutional distinction should be
made between worthy and unworthy containers in determining whether the police search has invaded any
protected privacy interests has been dismissed by the Court as improper. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 426-27 (1981).
43. 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2168 & n.21.
46. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
47. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). For the history and development of this exception, see infra
text accompanying notes 147-206.
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destruction of evidence, is permitted to search "the arrestee's person and the
area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence." 48 The search incident to arrest standard has been difficult to apply
uniformly when the defendant has been arrested while driving an auto-
mobile. 49 Recognizing the problem, the Court in Belton attempted to fashion a
workable definition:
In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read
Chimel's definition of the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that
generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest search the passenger compartment of that automobile. 
50
Because the Court further held that the permissible scope of this search would
include any containers found within the automobile, 5' it also upheld the
search of the defendant's jacket as a valid search incident to arrest.52 Thus,
whether the search at issue is incident to arrest or falls under the automobile
exception, a warrantless search of any containers found within the passenger
compartment of the automobile will be upheld (provided, of course, that the
other requirements of the fourth amendment are met, such as probable cause
to arrest in a search incident and probable cause to search the automobile in
the automobile exception).5 3
The Supreme Court often has stated that the fourth amendment requires
a warrant as a necessary element of the reasonableness of the search.54 As a
result of the Court's historical belief that warrantless searches are "per se
unreasonable ' 55  unless they come under the "few ' 56  and "well-
delineated" 57 exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth amend-
ment, the Court has developed several divergent doctrines in an effort to
48. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
49. Compare United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant arrested for possession of
heroin; search of paper bag on floor of car after defendant was handcuffed held valid as a search incident to
arrest), with United States v. Rigoles, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant was one of several passengers in
car in which driver was arrested; search of leather pouch on floor of car while defendant remained in the car,
which produced a gun illegally owned by defendant, held not incident to arrest of driver).
50. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 462-63.
53. Until Ross, an immediate search of the containers was permissible only under the search incident to
arrest exception. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), had denied these searches under the automobile
exception. See infra text accompanying notes 138-45.
54. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 423 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758
(1979); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,497 (1958); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,23 (1925); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914). For a general
history of the development of the Court's search and seizure approach, see J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966). It has been argued, however, that the Court is historically
incorrect in placing greater emphasis on the warrant requirement than on the reasonableness of the search. See
T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 46-47 (1969).
55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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reconcile the practical realities of effective law enforcement with the Court's
expressed preference for search warrants.58
Because the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest ex-
ception often overlap within a particular factual context,59 it is not surprising
that, viewed from the analytical standpoint of a warrant-preference approach
to the fourth amendment, the course of the law has "not ... run smooth." 60
The expression "warrant-preference" refers to the historical approach the
Court has taken to fourth amendment cases. The Court will consider the facts
before it and-unless some exigency existed that rendered the procurement of
a warrant impractical-will hold the search or seizure impermissible if no
warrant was obtained. This Comment will focus on whether the Court truly
has required an exigency before it has waived the warrant requirement. The
allowance of a warrantless search or seizure in the absence of any exigency
that renders the procurement of a warrant impractical clearly is inconsistent
with the Court's oft-repeated statement that warrantless searches are "per se
unreasonable." 
6 1
Thus, it is necessary to examine the development of the two doctrines
and, with a warrant-preference approach in mind, to determine whether the
Court has remained loyal to its professed approach or, instead, has moved
implicitly toward a more functional approach to the fourth amendment in the
law of automobile search and seizure.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF WARRANTLESS SEIzuRE EXCEPTIONS
Both the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest excep-
tion are different today from their original formulations. 62 The Court's modi-
fications of the original exceptions have been in response to the various
circumstances in which police can apply the exceptions. This Comment will
focus first on the history of these modifications and then will turn to an
analysis of whether these modifications are consistent with a warrant-prefer-
ence approach.
A. The Automobile Exception
Carroll v. United States63 was the first major case concerning a warrant-
less search of an automobile to come before the Supreme Court. In Carroll
two individuals in an automobile were stopped on a highway by federal agents
who had probable cause to believe that they were transporting liquor in viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act.64 After arresting the two individuals the
58. See infra text accompanying notes 62-206.
59. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search ofa Clearer
Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987, 1012-22 (1976).
60. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See infra part IV.
61. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 63-206.
63. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
64. The arrest and subsequent conviction were also for violation of the National Prohibition Act, ch. 85,
Title II, § 25, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1921) (repealed 1933).
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agents searched the car and found six cases of whiskey and gin hidden under
the seat. In upholding the conviction and by ruling that the evidence was
admissible as the result of a reasonable search, the Court recognized that
there is a
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search
of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 65
Thus, the Court considered the inherent mobility of a vehicle to be a circum-
stance that would eliminate the need for a warrant before a police officer
could conduct a reasonable search. Still, the Court narrowly construed the
exception, for it asserted that absent probable cause to search no justification
existed for a warrantless search of an automobile.6 Thus, the automobile
exception as originally conceived in Carroll consisted of two elements: prob-
able cause to search and mobility of the object to be searched. 67 The mobility
gave rise to an exigency that obviated the need to secure a warrant. The Court
was careful to note that the right to search under this exception was separate
from the right to arrest and that the absence of one would not invalidate the
other.68
For years after Carroll little development of the automobile exception
occurred because most automobile searches were upheld under the search
incident to arrest doctrine. 69 The few cases argued under the automobile
exception were merely routine applications of the exception as originally
stated. 70 When the Supreme Court drastically reduced the permissible scope
of a warrantless search incident to arrest in Chimel v. California,7' however,
the automobile exception gained a renewed importance.
Chambers v. Maroney,72 the first major case after Chimel, worked a
significant temporal expansion into the Carroll exigency requirement. In
Chambers the Court considered a search of an automobile at the police station
after the police had arrested the occupants for armed robbery of a service
station. 73 Because the defendants and their car matched descriptions given to
65. 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
66. Id. at 154.
67. This original understanding is contrary to the implication of the Court in Ross that the mobility of the
object to be searched was not the critical factor in Carroll that justified an immediate search. See United States
v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2163-64, 2169 (1982).
68. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
69. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer
Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987, 1000-01 (1976).
70. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938);
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); United States v.
Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
71. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Chimel limited the scope of a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest to the
person of the arrestee and the area under his immediate control. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
Because of this limitation police no longer could justify a total search of the automobile as incident to the arrest
of its occupant.
72. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
73. Id. at 44.
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police by eyewitnesses, the Court found probable cause both to arrest 74 the
defendants and to search the car at the scene of the arrest.75 The issue pre-
sented in Chambers, however, was whether the later search at the police
station could be upheld.
The Court, noting that the warrantless search had occurred after the car
had been taken to the police station, held that the search could not be justified
as a valid search incident to arrest because it was too removed in time from
the arrest. 76 In considering the exigency requirement of the Carroll exception,
the Court found that an immediate search of the automobile at the scene of the
arrest would have been valid.77 In determining whether the later search also
was valid, the Court compared the potential intrusions on the defendant's
fourth amendment interests:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the
immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained;
arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes
the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which the "lesser" intrusion is
itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circum-
stances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.78
Justice Harlan, who concurred in part and dissented in part, did not find
the comparison of intrusions to be at all debatable. He stated that "the lesser
intrusion will almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period
.. necessary to enable the officers to obtain a search warrant. ' 79 For oc-
cupants who might consider the seizure of the automobile as the greater
intrusion, Justice Harlan argued that those occupants always could consent to
an immediate search.80
Chambers thus expanded the temporal scope of the Carroll exception.
When an immediate search of the automobile would be justified under the
Carroll exception to the warrant requirement, a subsequent warrantless
search at the police station also would be valid.8 '
74. Id. at 46.
75. Id. at 47 n.6.
76. In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), the Court stated: "Once an accused is under arrest
and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to arrest." Id. at
367. But see United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (After defendant had been placed in jail for
attempted breaking and entering, probable cause arose that his clothes contained evidence of the break-in
attempt. The next day, the defendant's clothing was exchanged for prison clothes. A subsequent warrantless
search of defendant's clothes was held to be a valid search incident to arrest.).
77. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
78. Id. at 51-52.
79. Id. at 63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 64.
81. In the later case of Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), the Court upheld the warrantless search of
defendant's car at the police station after the defendant's arrest for passing fraudulent checks. Justice Marshall
in his dissenting opinion argued that the rationale of Chambers should be extended only when seizure of the car
was justified. Id. at 70. The majority, however, rejected this limitation.
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The next major case addressed by the Court, Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire,8" has been described as "a veritable encyclopedia of fourth amendment
law.", 83 In Coolidge the police were investigating the defendant for the
murder of a young girl. After a three-week investigation during which prob-
able cause to arrest the defendant had arisen, the police, acting pursuant to a
search warrant, arrested the defendant at his home and towed his two cars to
the police station. 84 Three subsequent searches85 of the defendant's cars pro-
duced evidence linking him to the crime. The Court held that the search
warrant was constitutionally defective.8 6 Thus, it had to determine whether
the seizure and subsequent search could be upheld under either the auto-
mobile exception or the search incident to arrest exception. 7
After first determining that the seizure and search of the two automobiles
were not incident to the defendant's arrest, 88 the Court turned to the auto-
mobile exception. In its previous automobile exception cases the Court had
been faced with circumstances in which probable cause to arrest and the
arrest itself almost occurred simultaneously. 89 For this reason the Court had
the opportunity to consider only whether an exigency existed subsequent to
the arrest that eliminated the need to secure a warrant.
In contrast, the Court in Coolidge had considered an arrest and a seizure
that had occurred some time after probable cause to arrest had arisen. Thus,
the Court examined the facts to determine whether any exigency existed
before the arrest to prevent the procurement of a search warrant. Finding
none, the Court held that the search of the defendant's car was not a valid
search under the automobile exception because no exigency had occurred to
prevent the procurement of a warrant before the initial seizure.90
Thus, the Court viewed the requirement of exigency as existing both
prior to and after the arrest. The Court held that because a Carroll search
would have been invalid if conducted at the defendant's house, the subse-
quent search at the police station also would be invalid under Chambers since
82. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
83. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer
Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987, 1004 (1976).
84. 403 U.S. 443, 447 (1971).
85. The first search occurred two days after defendant's arrest, the second a year later, and the final search
occurred fifteen months after defendant's arrest. At the defendant's subsequent trial for murder, vacuum
sweepings were introduced in evidence against him, as part ofan attempt by the State to show by microscopic
analysis that it was highly probable that the murder victim had been in his car. Id. at 448.
86. The arrest and search warrants had been issued by the Attorney General of New Hampshire, who
personally had supervised the investigation and was later to serve as Chief Prosecutor at the trial. Id. at 447.
This bias violated the neutral magistrate requirement of the fourth amendment and thus rendered the search
warrant invalid. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
87. In essence, the Court had to approach the case as though no warrant had been obtained. 403 U.S. 443,
453 (1971).
88. Because Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), was decided after the defendant's arrest in 1964, the
Court decided the search incident to arrest issue under the earlier, more expansive standard. 403 U.S. 443,
455-56 (1971). Even so, the Court held that the search was not incident to arrest because it had not been
reasonably contemporaneous with the arrest. Id. at 457. See supra note 76.
89. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
90. 403 U.S. 443, 478 (1971).
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a Chambers search is permissible only when a preceding Carroll search is
allowed. 91 The Court also held that the seizure of the automobiles could not
be justified as a valid plain view 92 exception because police knowledge of the
cars' presence rendered their discovery inevitable (not inadvertent). 9 Justice
Black, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that the Court should
distinguish between automobiles seized as instrumentalities of the crime itself
and automobiles seized as mere containers of evidence.
94
Coolidge marked a significant modification of the Carroll exigency re-
quirement. It also reaffirmed the limitation of a Chambers search to those
instances in which a preceding Carroll search would be permissible.
The Court's next case in this area was Cardwell v. Lewis.95 Cardwell
reflected the privacy concepts of Katz v. United States96 and seemed to be a
partial adoption of the position urged by Justice Black in Coolidge.
In Cardwell the police were investigating a murder in which another car
had pushed the victim's car over an embankment. At the scene police had
taken casts of the tire tracks and paint scrapings from the victim's car. 97 The
police questioned the defendant within a week after the murder, and they
observed that his car was similar to the make and model of the probable
murder vehicle. The police did not question the defendant again for several
months, during which time probable cause arose to arrest him. 93 When the
defendant reappeared for questioning, the police, acting pursuant to an arrest
warrant, arrested the defendant and towed his car to a police impoundment
lot. 99 There the police conducted a warrantless search of the exterior of the
defendant's car and obtained tire casts and paint scrapings. "0 This evidence
was admitted at trial and the defendant was convicted for murder. '
0
'
Although the police had ample time to secure a search warrant before the
defendant returned for questioning,'02 the Court refused to see Cardwell as
another Coolidge. Rather, the Court chose to frame the issue in terms of
privacy:
This case is factually different from prior car search cases decided by this
Court. The evidence with which we are concerned is not the product of a "search"
91. Id. at 463. Justice MIarshall, in his dissenting opinion in Ross, indicated his understanding that Coolidge
would continue to be applicable to searches of parked cars and that the rule in Ross would not be extended to those
searches. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2174 n.l (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, evidence can be seized by an officer who
inadvertently comes across it pursuant to a priorjustified intrusion. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
466 (1971). For containers found within an automobile during a warrantless search, this exception has been
expanded to include containers whose contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979).
93. 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
94. Id. at 505 n.2 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
97. 417 U.S. 583, 586 (1974).
98. Id. at 587.
99. Id. at 587-88.
100. Id. at 588.
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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that implicates traditional considerations of the owner's privacy interest. It con-
sisted of paint scrapings from the exterior and an observation of the tread of a tire
on an operative wheel. The issue, therefore, is whether the examination of an
automobile's exterior upon probable cause invades a right to privacy which the
interposition of a warrant requirement is meant to protect. '03
The Court asserted that the defendant had a lesser expectation of privacy in
his automobile "because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects." 104 The Court distin-
guished Coolidge on the grounds that the search in Coolidge did not concern
the exterior of the car'05 and that the defendant's car was seized on public
property, 106 not on private property as in Coolidge.
The Court responded to the defendant's argument that, because probable
cause to search the car had arisen before his arrest, no exigency prevented the
police from obtaining a search warrant:
Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle
that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of
seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not
obtained at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to
vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and
arises only at the time of arrest .... The exigency may arise at any time, and the
fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the
possibility of a current situation's necessitating prompt police action. 107
Justice Stewart, who wrote the Coolidge opinion, argued in a dissenting
opinion that the initial seizure was not justified because "[w]here there is no
reasonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be moved, the
Carroll doctrine is simply inapplicable." 108 Thus, Justice Stewart implicitly
rejected the inherent mobility of the automobile alone as an exigent circum-
stance. 109
A search of a container found within an automobile (compared to a
search of the automobile itself) was the issue the Court faced in United States
v. Chadwick.110 In Chadwick federal agents in San Diego notified federal
narcotics agents in Boston that two individuals on a train to Boston were
suspected of carrying a brown footlocker containing marijuana or hashish, '
The federal agents arrested the defendants two days after they arrived, as the
defendants were placing a footlocker, identified by a police dog as containing
marijuana, into the trunk of a waiting automobile. " 2 An hour and a half later
103. 417 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1974).
104. Id. at 590.
105. Id. at 591.
106. Id. at 593.
107. Id. at 595-96.
108. Id. at 598 (emphasis added). This statement supports the position taken by Justice Marshall in his
dissenting opinion in Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). See supra note 81.
109. If inherent mobility alone cannot satisfy the impracticality requirement of the automobile exception,
see supra text accompanying note 65, one wonders why the Court upheld the search in Chambers.
110. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
Ill. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 4.
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at the federal building, the agents searched the footlocker without first obtain-
ing consent or a search warrant. '1 3 The Government used the marijuana found
in the footlocker as evidence against the defendants.
The Government, although failing to argue that this search was within the
automobile exception, nevertheless contended that the Court should extend
the rationale of those searches to the case before the Court. Thus, when a
warrantless search of an automobile would be permissible, a warrantless
search of any luggage or containers found therein also would be permis-
sible. 114 The Court, although noting that both luggage and automobiles have
mobility characteristics, "' answered that the Court's separate treatment of
automobiles depended not only on their mobility but also on their lesser
privacy interests; this lesser privacy interest, the Court argued, did not char-
acterize personal luggage. [16
The Court further indicated that "when no exigency 17 is shown to sup-
port the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at
the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive do-
minion of police authority."" 8 The majority rejected the dissenting
opinion's 19 argument that the search was a valid search incident to arrest,
because it was too "remote in time [and] place from the arrest." 20 In a
concurring opinion Justice Brennan also rejected the search as a valid search
incident to arrest, but on the grounds that although the footlocker might have
been within the defendant's "immediate control," 12, its contents were not. 1 2
Although Chadwick arguably is not an automobile exception case, 12 it
established a distinction in privacy interests between automobiles and per-
sonal luggage contained therein. Thus, the Court created a line of reasoning
separate from that of the Carroll-Chambers line of cases.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 11-12. This argument also was advanced by the Government in Ross, and in that case, the Court
accepted it. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. In Ross the Court distinguished Chadwick because,
unlike Ross, probable cause had been focused on one particular container rather than on the automobile in
general. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1982). Thus, Ross creates an implication that an immediate
warrantless search of a container shall be disallowed when the container itself is the object of probable cause and
is not merely an incident of the search of the automobile itself. For an analysis of the logical inconsistencies of
this distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 316-25.
115. 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
116. Id. at 13.
117. The Court in an earlier passage stated that the elements which would constitute an exigency were
"[the] belie[f] that the footlocker contained explosives or other inherently dangerous items, or that it contained
evidence which would lose its value unless the footlocker were opened at once." Id. at 4.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Id. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 15 (quoting Preston v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
121. 433 U.S. 1, 17 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. The Belton Court ignored this distinction. See supra text
accompanying notes 51-53.
123. Arguably, Chadwick is not an automobile exception case because the focus of police suspicion had
been the particular footlocker itself and not the automobile as a general container of evidence as in previous
cases. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In addition, the footlocker's relationship to the automobile had
been described as "coincidental" by the district court. 433 U.S. 1, 5 (1977). However, the case has been cited as
a part of the automobile exception doctrine. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981). See supra
note 114.
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Arkansas v. Sanders'24 presented a factual background in which the two
lines of thought met directly. The issue was whether, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before searching lug-
gage taken from an automobile pursuant to a Carroll search.'25
As in Chadwick, an informant had notified the police that the defendant
would be arriving the same day on a plane and that he would be carrying a
green suitcase containing marijuana. 2 6 Contrary to the police action in
Chadwick, in Sanders the police waited until the defendant had placed the
suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and had driven away before stopping him several
blocks from the airport. 127 At the request of the police, the taxi driver opened
the trunk. The police opened and searched the suitcase, finding 9.3 pounds of
marijuana packed in 10 plastic bags.' 28
The State argued that the search was valid under the Carroll rule,' 29 but
the Court rejected the State's argument:
A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be
assessed at the point immediately before the search-after the police have seized
the object to be searched and have it securely within their control .... Once the
police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no
way affected by the place from which it was taken. Accordingly, as a general rule
there is no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from auto-
mobiles than of luggage taken from other places. 130
The Court did not extend the logic of this statement to all containers; rather,
in a footnote the Court stated:
Not all containers and packages found by the police during the course of a search
will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers
(for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot
support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be in-
ferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a
package will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant. 131
Sanders has caused considerable confusion in the courts. 132 The decision
seemed to inject the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test' 33 into the
124. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
125. Id. at 756.
126. Id. at 755. Compared with Chadwick, the police here had little time to secure a warrant before going to
meet the defendant. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
127. 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 761. Note again that the focus of probable cause was a specific container and not the automobile
in general.
130. Id. at 763-64 (footnotes omitted). The Ross Court subsequently rejected the latter part of this reason-
ing. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
131. 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979).
132. Compare United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
in plastic bag inside paper bag) and United States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy in cardboard box), with United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980) (reason-
able expectation of privacy in leather tote bag) and United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1979)
(reasonable expectation of privacy in plastic portfolio).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
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everyday decision-making process of police faced with the practical applica-
tion of fourth amendment protections.
In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Burger argued that Sanders was not
an automobile exception case because the focus of police suspicion had re-
mained only on the green suitcase and not on the taxi in general.'34 The Chief
Justice further asserted that the relationship of a piece of luggage to an auto-
'35
mobile does not, by itself, give rise to an automobile exception case.
Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist,
argued that "the expectation of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is
probably not significantly greater than the expectation of privacy in a locked
glove compartment or trunk" 3 6 and that the additional intrusion of a search is
incidental compared to the intrusion engendered by the initial seizure. 137
Thus, in Sanders the Court extended the rationale of Chadwick to a
Carroll or Chambers situation so that some containers and luggage would not
be susceptible to a warrantless search as would the rest of the automobile.
Within this framework the Court recently decided Robbins v. California. 38
In Robbins the police stopped the defendant for erratic driving. After
approaching the car and asking for a driver's license, the officers smelled
marijuana. 139 The officers ordered the defendant out of his car. A search of the
passenger compartment revealed marijuana and equipment for using it. After
putting the defendant in the patrol car, the policemen searched the trunk,
finding a tote bag and two opaque plastic packages.' 40 The officers opened the
packages; each contained fifteen pounds of marijuana."' On review the
Supreme Court considered the search of the opaque containers that was sub-
142sequent to the defendant's placement in the patrol car.
In a decision later partially overruled by Ross, "43 the Court held that
(unlike the search of the automobile) no exigency existed that warranted an
immediate search, rather than seizure, of the packages.'44 The Court further
rejected the Government's argument that the plastic packages, as "unworthy
containers," manifested no significant privacy interest that would invoke
134. 442 U.S. 753, 767 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 769 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Ross Court later agreed with Justice Blackmun that no
significant distinction can be made in relative privacy interests among containers and automobile compartments.
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1982).
137. 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
139. Id. at 422.
140. Each wrapped and sealed package was described as "resembl[ing] an oversized, extra-long cigar box
with slightly rounded comers and edges." Id. n. 1 (1981) (quoting People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34,44, 162
Cal. Rptr. 780, 785 (1980) (Rattigan, J., dissenting)).
141. 453 U.S. 420, 422 (1981).
142. Id. at 423.
143. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
144. 453 U.S. 420, 424 (1981).
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fourth amendment protections. 45 With this background, the Court recently
decided United States v. Ross.' 46
B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
It is somewhat of a misnomer to term the search incident to arrest doc-
trine an exception to the fourth amendment warrant clause. The doctrine has
historical and theoretical roots separate from those of the automobile excep-
tion. One commentator has observed, "There is little reason to doubt that
search of an arrestee's person and premises is as old as the institution of arrest
itself." 141 In England the reasonableness of these searches was not challenged
until the end of the nineteenth century, and even then the English courts gave
the matter little attention.' 48 Evidence also exists that the framers of the
fourth amendment gave little thought to the search incident to arrest; it was
considered inherently reasonable. 1
49
If the framers did indeed give the search incident to arrest little thought,
even more evidence exists that the courts accepted these searches as in-
herently reasonable.' 50 Justice Rehnquist has noted that "[v]irtually all of the
statements of this Court affirming the existence of an unqualified authority to
search incident to a lawful arrest are dicta." 151
The search incident to arrest doctrine consists of two parts: search of the
person of the arrestee and search of the premises on which he is arrested. '
52
Two justifiable purposes exist for each: securement of the arresting officer's
safety by preventing the defendant from obtaining a weapon, and avoidance
of the destruction of evidence. ' The permissible scope of the search of the
arrestee's person has remained unchanged;'54 a full personal search is a
reasonable search. 55 It is within the second part of the doctrine-the search
of the premises on which the arrestee is arrested-that the Court has modified
the permissible scope of a warrantless search.
In two early decisions the Court delineated the general contours of the
search incident to arrest. In Weeks v. United States 56 the Court recognized
"the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English
145. Id. at 426-27. This part of the Robbins opinion was reaffirmed by the Ross Court. United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1982).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 24-45.
147. T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28 (1969).
148. See, e.g., Elias v. Pasmore, 2 K.B. 164 (1934).
149. T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 27-46 (1969).
150. Id. at 188 n.77.
151. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230 (1973).
152. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
155. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
156. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested
to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime." 157 In Agnello v. United
States 58 the Court, in dictum, also recognized the right of police to search the
premises on which the arrestee is arrested:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons
lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as
the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to
effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted. '9
Thus, after Agnello the Court considered warrantless searches incident
to arrest of the arrestee's person and of the premises on which he was arrested
as reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The Court, how-
ever, had yet to articulate the temporal and spatial limits of the permissible
scope of the search of the premises.
In initially analyzing the spatial elements of a search incident to arrest,
the Court in Harris v. United States'6 formulated a broad definition for the
permissible scope of the search of the premises incident to an arrest. In Harris
police had arrested the defendant pursuant to an arrest warrant at his four-
room apartment for violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940. 6' After police handcuffed the defendant, they conducted a thorough
five-hour search of his apartment and found eight Notice of Classification
cards and eleven Registration Certificates in a sealed envelope in a bedroom
drawer.' 62 The evidence was used against the defendant at his subsequent
trial.
Although the defendant physically was unable to secure a weapon or
destroy evidence, the Court upheld the search as a valid search incident to
arrest.' 63 Finding that the "[p]etitioner was in exclusive possession of a four
room apartment," 164 the Court held the search to be reasonable.
Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion, rejected the majority opinion
as creating a rule of "constructive possession," 165 thus unnecessarily broad-
ening the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest. He argued that the
limits of these searches should not be coequal with those of the right to arrest:
"Authority to arrest does not dispose with the requirement of authority to
search." '66
The Court reaffirmed this implicit equality of authority in United States
v. Rabinowitz.'67 In Rabinowitz police arrested the defendant at his one-room
157. Id. at 392.
158. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
159. Id. at 20.
160. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
161. Ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (expired 1947).
162. 331 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1947).
163. Id. at 156.
164. Id. at 152.
165. Id. at 164 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 269-70.
166. 331 U.S. 145, 165 (1947).
167. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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office for stamp forgery.'68 Although the police had secured an arrest warrant,
they failed to get a search warrant. After the defendant's arrest the police
conducted a ninety minute search of his desk, safe, and file cabinets.' 69 This
search revealed forged stamps that later were used as evidence against the
defendant. 170 The Court upheld the search, finding the entire room to be
within the defendant's "immediate control." '
7
'
Justice Frankfurter, in another strong dissent, admonished that "It]he
exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule." 172 He argued that the permis-
sible scope of the search incident to arrest should be more spatially limited
than that allowed by the majority and that confinement of warrantless
searches to the area under an arrestee's "physical control" '73 would be more
consonant with fourth amendment protections. The Court did not adopt this
narrower exception until years later. 174
In Preston v. United States 75 the Court analyzed the temporal elements
of a valid search incident to arrest. Police observed the defendant and two
companions sitting in a parked car for five hours. When their answers to a
questioning police officer were unsatisfactory, all three were arrested for
vagrancy. 76 After searching the defendant at the scene of the arrest, the
police took the car to the police station and then ordered it towed to a garage.
At the garage a search of the glove compartment and trunk produced two
loaded revolvers, caps, women's stockings, rope, pillow slips, and an illegally
manufactured license plate. "n After one of the defendant's companions con-
fessed, the police used the evidence to convict the defendant of conspiring to
rob a federally insured bank. 78
In reviewing the search of the automobile, the Court did not accept the
Government's argument that the later search of the automobile was incident
to arrest. Rather, it held that "[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in cus-
tody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not
incident to arrest." 179 The Court thus narrowed the exception to those
searches that are contemporaneous to the arrest.
The Court next addressed both the temporal and spatial elements of the
search incident to arrest doctrine in Chimel v. California, 180 in which the
168. Id. at 58.
169. Id. at 59.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 72.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 180-91.
175. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
176. Id. at 365.
177. Id. at 365-466.
178. Id. at 366.
179. Id. at 367. Although the logic of a decision dealing with an automobile search is not inexorably
applicable to a similar later search of fixed premises such as a home, it would be difficult to justify a lesser
protection since automobiles generally have been perceived by the Court as deserving less protection under the
fourth amendment than houses and buildings. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
180. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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Court articulated what has become the modem rule for searches incident to
arrest. In Chimel the police arrested the defendant, a suspect in a burglary of a
coin shop, as he arrived at his home. Although the police had arrested him in
his living room, they conducted a warrantless search of the entire house.' 8' In
the master bedroom and sewing room police found several coins and other
objects inside the dresser drawers. 82 At the defendant's trial these items were
used as evidence over his objection that they had been seized unconstitu-
tionally., 83
The Court refused to adopt the State's argument that the search was a
valid search incident to arrest under Rabinowitz, commenting that Rabinowitz
was "hardly founded on an unimpeachable line of authority."'84 Instead, it
chose to rely on the rationale of its recent decision in Terry v. Ohio"85 that
"'[t]he scope of [a] search must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.' "8 Accordingly,
the Court retreated from the spatially broad Rabinowitz rule and held:
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the
area "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any
room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that matter, for searching
through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only
after the authority of a search warrant. 187
Although Rabinowitz had concerned a single room i8 and Harris a four-room
apartment, 189 the Court rejected the logic of those decisions as removing "any
point of rational limitation [to the search], once the search is allowed to go
beyond the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or
evidentiary items."90
181. Id. at 754. The police had procured an arrest warrant, however. Id. at 753.
182. Id. at 754.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 760.
185. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry a policeman had stopped three men walking on the street for questioning
after the policeman had observed the men's behavior and had become suspicious that they were planning a
robbery. Id. at 6. A pat-down search of the men revealed two guns. Id. at 7. The two men carrying guns were
charged and convicted for carrying concealed weapons. Id. at 7-8. On appeal the Court was faced with
determining the permissible scope of a search pursuant to an investigatory stop. Because of the need for
investigatory stops, id. at 22, and the need for police to insure their own safety, id. at 23, the Court reasoned that
a pat-down search was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 30. It noted, however, that a full search
comparable to one incident to arrest would not be reasonable in this context; rather, it asserted that this limited
search was justified only by the need to disarm the suspect, not to avoid the destruction of evidence. Id. at 29.
186. 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
187. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (footnotes omitted). The limitations expressed by the Chimel Court in the
second paragraph of the quoted material apparently were overlooked by the Ross Court when it implied that a
warrantless search of fixed premises may extend to any container found within those premises. United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1982).
188. See supra text accompanying note 168.
189. See supra text accompanying note 161.
190. 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
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Chimel, then, implicitly reaffirmed the temporal limitation of Preston and
signaled a dramatic retreat from the spatially broad limitations of Rabinowitz.
After Chimel the scope of a permissible search incident to arrest that is
contemporaneous with the arrest extended to a search of the person and the
area "within his immediate control."''
The Court's next major holding, United States v. Robinson,'92 re-
examined the permissible scope of the search of the person incident to arrest.
What historically had been taken for granted 93 was for the first time the
subject of concrete debate.
In Robinson the defendant had been arrested while driving his car by an
officer who, because of a previous investigation following a check of the
defendant's driver's license four days earlier, had probable cause to believe
that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his
license. '94 A pat-down search of the defendant's coat revealed a crumpled
cigarette package in which heroin was found. '95 The defendant was convicted
for possession of heroin after the heroin was admitted as evidence at his
trial. 196
Because no evidence exists to be seized to prove the crime for which the
defendant had been arrested-operating a motor vehicle without an opera-
tor's permit-the Court split on whether a full search'97 or only a more limited
Terry weapons search should have been permitted.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected the idea that the
existence of probable cause to fully search the person of the arrestee must be
litigated in each case:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a
suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the
Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an
analysis of each step in the search. The authority to search the person incident to a
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover
evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in
a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect. 198
Justice Rehnquist further held that when police make a custodial arrest based
on probable cause "a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification."'99
191: Id. at 763.
192. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51. Previous decisions by the Court, although reaffirming the
right of an officer to search the person of the arrestee incident to arrest, nonetheless were concerned with
searches of the permissible area beyond the person of the arrestee. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 374 (1964); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
194. 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
195. Id. at 223.
196. Id.
197. The court of appeals had argued that the purpose of a full search could only be evidentiary. Id. at 233.
198. Id. at 235.
199. Id.
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Justice Marshall argued in his dissenting opinion that the scope of the
search in nonevidentiary crimes should be limited to a Terry search because
the only plausible purpose is to seize weapons. 20' Even if the seizure of the
cigarette package could be justified, Justice Marshall felt that "clearly there
[could be] no justification consistent with the Fourth Amendment which
would authorize [the officer's] opening the package and looking inside. ' 20 ,
Despite Justice Marshall's concern, Robinson and Chimel constitute the
current standard for searches incident to arrest. Once an arrest has occurred,
a contemporaneous 202 warrantless search of the person203 and the area under
his immediate control is reasonable under the fourth amendment.
Although these standards seem simple, courts have found them difficult
to apply to automobile searches. Prior to New York v. Belton2°4 courts were
diverse in their interpretation of the "area within the arrestee's immediate
control" as it applied to containers found in an automobile incident to its
occupant's arrest.2 5 In Belton, however, the Court definitely interpreted "the
area within the arrestee's immediate control" to include all containers found
in the passenger compartment of the automobile. z°
IV. DEPARTURE FROM A WARRANT-PREFERENCE APPROACH
A review of the development of the automobile exception and the
search incident to arrest exception indicates that the two doctrines have
undergone considerable change. It is doubtful, however, whether the devel-
opment of these doctrines reflects a true warrant-preference approach to the
fourth amendment. Indeed, separate examinations of the historical origins
and theoretical justifications of each doctrine will reveal that any relationship
between their doctrinal development and an expressed judicial preference for
warrants is tenuous at best. Furthermore, this Comment will show that com-
pelling reasons exist for the Court to retreat from strict adherence to a war-
rant-preference approach.
200. Id. at 252-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 255-56.
202. But see United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), in which probable cause to believe the
defendant's clothing contained paint chips from an attempted burglary arose after the defendant had been
arrested and placed in a cell. The next morning the police exchanged prison clothes for the defendant's and
conducted a warrantless search of defendant's clothes. The Supreme Court upheld the search as incident to
arrest, stating that "the normal processes incident to arrest and custody had not been completed when [the
defendant] was placed in his cell [that night]." Id. at 804.
203. A limited search of the person for evidence that was not incident to arrest was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). The defendant's wife had died by strangulation and, while her
husband was at the police station for questioning, dark spots similar to dried blood w6re observed on his
fingernails. Id. at 292. Over the defendant's objections, and without a warrant, the police took a sample scraping
from the defendant's fingernails. Id. The scraping revealed traces of the victim's blood and nightgown, but the
defendant was not arrested for more than a month after the scraping was taken. Id. at 294. Although the Court
held that the full Chimel search would not have been justified, 1d. at 296, it upheld the search because of its
limited nature and the ready destructibility of the evidence. Id.
204. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
205. See supra note 49.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
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A. The Automobile Exception
The creation of the automobile exception was the result of judicial recog-
nition that "[a] necessary difference [exists] between a search of a store,
dwelling house or other structure ... [and] a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile ... where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved ..... 207 The Carroll Court real-
ized that procurement of a search warrant would be impractical under these
circumstances; thus, because of the necessity for effective law enforcement
the Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment. Recognition of this exception was a critical development in the
law, for it marked a substantial departure from the underlying policy of the
fourth amendment as stated later in Johnson v. United States2°S:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime. 209
Police officers, rather than a "neutral magistrate," now would make the
initial determination whether probable cause existed to search an auto-
mobile.2-0
Because of this substantial departure, the Carroll Court required an
exigency2 l' before it would allow the police to exercise their discretion in
searching an automobile. The original exception, as thus understood, was
consistent with a warrant-preference approach 2 2 because the requirement of
a warrant ostensibly would be waived only when it was impractical to obtain
one.
Later decisions have broadened the original scope of this exception, thus
marking a departure from a warrant-preference approach. The expansion of
the exception is attributable to two sources: the judicial emasculation of the
207. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
208. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
209. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted). Although Ross would indicate that the rationale of Johnson has been
abandoned, the Court implied that only the timing of the protection afforded by interposition of a neutral
magistrate had been changed; the neutral magistrate now would determine the reasonableness of a search on an
ad hoc basis. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
210. This initial decision, of course, is not conclusive. The issue of probable cause, if raised, would be
reviewed by the trial court prior to trial.
211. See supra note 32.
212. One may wonder why the Court, to adhere more closely to a warrant-preference approach simply did
not require the federal agents to tow the car to a police station or to immobilize it until a search warrant could be
obtained. Although the Court did not address this point, it may have allowed an immediate search rather than a
seizure because the items seized-bootleg whiskey and gin-were contraband and thus inherently illegal (rather
than evidence only of a crime). The Court rejected this contraband-evidence dichotomy in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967). See also Justice Marshall's explanation of the Carroll Court's allowance of an
immediate search rather than seizure. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2178 n.6 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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meaning of exigency and the often illogical use of privacy concepts in the
analysis of the permissible scope of police action in an automobile search.
In Chambers v. Maroney213 the Court substantially altered the meaning
of exigency. The Court previously had interpreted exigency to imply circum-
stances under which it is impracticable for police to procure a search warrant
before searching an automobile.2 4 By allowing a warrantless search of the
automobile after it had been taken to the police station solely because a
search at the scene of the arrest would have been reasonable under Carroll,
the Court ignored the original justification for the Carroll exception: actual
mobility of the vehicle.
Although the Court in Carroll had allowed a warrantless search because
of the exigency posed by the mobility of the automobile, it had not ruled out
a lesser response, such as a seizure, that also would obviate any exigency
posed by the mobility of the automobile. That the seizure in Chambers elim-
inated any existing exigency was noted by the Court itself in its Coolidge
211
opinion.
The Court's failure to recognize the seizure of the automobile as a suffi-
cient response to the exigency and its allowance of a subsequent search were
inconsistent with the Court's preference for warrants. Furthermore, the
Court's position cannot be reconciled with the dual nature of the fourth
amendment, because the fourth amendment proscribes both "unreasonable
searches and seizures.- 216 The warrantless seizure of the automobile in
Chambers can be justified as a reasonable response to the exigency of mobil-
ity. The subsequent search of the automobile, however, cannot be similarly
justified, for no "reasonable likelihood" 217 of the automobile's being moved
existed. Thus, the requirement of exigency was not met.
The Court's further conclusion in Chambers, that it is debatable once the
automobile is seized whether continued seizure until the police can obtain a
search warrant is a greater or lesser "intrusion" 218 than an immediate search,
also fails to distinguish the dual elements of privacy-one's possessory inter-
est in his automobile and his secrecy interest. 2 9 These interests are protected
separately by the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures
and unreasonable searches. Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion more con-
sistent with a warrant-preference approach, argued that only the seizure of
the automobile should be allowed unless the driver consents to an immediate
search.22 Thus, the Court's allowance of the subsequent search when an
213. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
214. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
215. 403 U.S. 443, 463 n.20 (1971).
216. See supra note 2.
217. See supra text accompanying note 108. See also infra text accompanying notes 343-45.
218. 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970). Only a few months earlier the Court found this to be not at all a debatable
question in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). In that case the Court held that given probable
cause to search packages placed in the mails the proper course to follow was to withhold delivery of the
packages until a search warrant could be obtained.
219. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835, 840 (1974).
220. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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immediate seizure had abated any exigency substantially expanded the per-
missible scope of warrantless searches and significantly impaired any im-
practicality connotations of the exigency requirement.
The second source of expansion of the automobile exception has been the
use of privacy concepts as a threshold test to determine whether a search in
the constitutional sense has occurred. The Court has interpreted the fourth
amendment as protecting primarily privacy interests; 22 1 and only those pri-
vacy interests having a reasonable expectation of privacy22 are subject to
constitutional protection. As a result, the narrow scope of infringement on
fourth amendment rights envisioned by the original understanding of the
automobile exception has been substantially supplemented by cases in which
the Court held the automobile "search" to be not a search at all because the
requisite degree of privacy interest was lacking. 23 In particular, in Cardwell
v. Lewis224 the imposition of a reasonable expectation of privacy test served
to justify a police search of the car's exterior when no exigency existed to
obviate the need for a search warrant.m
The greatest expansion of the exception (and, as a consequence, the
greatest degree of inconsistency with a warrant-preference approach) has
been in the illogical assignment of varying degrees of privacy interest to
various aspects of the automobile search. This inconsistent application of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to the automobile-container
dichotomy exemplified by Chadwick226 and Sanders.
22 7
The Court has stated that because automobiles are regulated 228 more
extensively and because their primary function is transportation, 229 they are
imbued with a lesser expectation of privacy than luggage.230 It cannot logically
be argued, however, that a locked glove compartment or trunk manifests any
less expectation of privacy than a simple box or plastic container sitting on the
seat of the car. Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion in Sanders, argued
that if one were to allow a search of the car, one also should allow a search of
containers found therein because "the expectation of privacy in a suitcase
found in the car is probably not significantly greater than the expectation of
privacy in a locked glove compartment or trunk." 23' Although one does not
have to accept Justice Blackmun's position that because both the container
and the trunk or glove compartment have equivalent expectations of privacy
221. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
222. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
223. The most common examples of this result are the container cases prior to Robbins. See, e.g., supra
note 132.
224. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 97-107.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 110-22.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 124-37.
228. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
229. Id. at 13.
230. Id.
231. 442 U.S. 753,769 (1969) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Ross Court has agreed with this rationale by
reaffirming Justice Blackmun's rejection of that distinction. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72
(1982).
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both should be allowed to be searched, one can agree that an insignificant
difference in the expectations of privacy does exist.
The distinction on which the Court relies, however, is the relative differ-
ence in the reasonable expectation of privacy between containers in the car
and parts of the car itself. Yet it is not apparent why it is more reasonable to
expect privacy in one's luggage than it is to expect privacy in one's locked
glove compartment or trunk. What other reason exists for these securable
areas if not privacy??
232
Another reason arises for the Court's disparate treatment of these two
items, a reason unrelated to the relative privacy interests. The Court in
Sanders noted that "[t]he difficulties in seizing and securing automobiles have
led the Court to make special allowances for their search. ' ' 1 3 Also, the impo-
sition of a requirement to seize rather than search automobiles would create
"severe, even impossible, burdens on many police departments."23-
A concern for potentially excessive administrative burdens on police
departments is legitimate; yet its proper relation to a warrant-preference ap-
proach to the fourth amendment is unclear. It also is questionable whether the
administrative burden consideration has played a significant role in deter-
mining the reasonableness of privacy expectations. If it has, then the analyti-
cal framework of privacy is a facade behind which a different judicial process
has been operating. These two developments-the emasculation of the im-
practicality connotation of the exigency requirement and the Court's illogical
application of a reasonable expectation of privacy standard-cast consider-
able doubt on the Court's continued adherence to a warrant-preference ap-
proach under the automobile exception.
B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
The search incident to arrest exception is based solely on the existence of
probable cause to arrest;2 35 once that requirement is met, the subsequent
search of the arrestee requires no further justification.2 6 Courts historically
have justified the search incident to arrest exception "by the need to seize
weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect
an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the
crime. -237
Because probable cause to believe that weapons or evidence will be
found is not required,238 it can be said that the exception is based on a func-
232. "'Privacy" is used here in the sense that one has both a possessory interest and a secrecy interest in his
automobile and his possessions. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 835, 840 (1974).
233. 442 U.S. 753, 763 n.10 (1979).
234. Id. at 765-66 n. 14. This administrative burden distinction also was recognized by the Ross Court.
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2166 n.16 (1982).
235. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
236. Id.
237. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
238. See supra text accompanying note 199.
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tional presumption of exigency; that is, the courts will assume a weapon
or destructible evidence exists because it is preferable to allow officers to
insure their own safety than to create a situation in which the officer must
either risk his safety or show probable cause for the search.
The Court's response to this functional presumption of exigency has been
to allow an extensive search of the person of the arrestee 2 9 and a search of
the area "within his immediate control." 240 Consistent with a warrant-prefer-
ence approach, the scope of the search of the area in which the person is
arrested has diminished through the years.24'
The scope of the permissible search of the person and the search of
containers found in an automobile, however, has not been consistent with a
warrant-preference approach. Ostensibly, the aims of an extensive search of
the person of the arrestee are the seizure of weapons and the prevention of the
destruction of evidence.
If the search is for weapons, the more limited Terry search 242 is sufficient
to protect an officer who stops individuals for investigatory reasons. This
limited pat-down search also would protect an arresting officer. The Court has
asserted the need for a more thorough search because the danger "'is not the
greater likelihood that a person taken into custody is armed, but rather the
increased likelihood of danger to the officer if in fact the person is armed."' 243
The problem with the Court's argument is that it presupposes an inadequate
search. It also does not consider any steps the police may take to insure the
inability of the arrestee to use any weapons a search may fail to reveal.
If a limited search is effective to assure an officer's safety (as in Terry), it
is not clear how the passage of time can change the effectiveness of that initial
search. In addition, the simple expedient of handcuffing an arrestee would
eliminate any possibility of using a weapon that the pat-down search may
have failed to detect. If the search is for destructible evidence, it again ap-
pears that the simple expedient of restraining the arrestee in some manner
would prevent the possibility of destruction.
In the search for weapons some evidence will come into plain view. The
propriety of seizing that evidence is not questioned. Yet there seems to be
little rationale for allowing a full search solely for evidence.
In Robinson the Court allowed the search of a cigarette package after it
had been taken from the defendant. 244 The majority failed to recognize the
distinction, noted by Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, that the seizure of
the cigarette package satisfied any interest of the police; thus no further
justification existed for the immediate search.2 45
239. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
240. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 155-91.
242. See supra note 185.
243. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 253 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting People v.
Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186,214,496 P.2d 1205, 1225, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837,857 (1972) ('Wright, C.J., concurring))
(emphasis in original).
244. 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
245. Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Powell in his concurring opinion sought to provide justification
for the search of the cigarette package, arguing:
If the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern.... The
search incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated
by the fact of arrest. 246
Justice Powell's monolithic approach to the fourth amendment is inconsistent
with the Court's statement in Chadwick that, once the footlocker had been
seized, "it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion
of a search without a warrant, ' ' 247 because, "[t]hough surely a substantial
infringement of [the defendant's] use and possession, the seizure did not
diminish [the defendant's] legitimate expectation that the footlocker's con-
tents would remain private." 248 In Chadwick the Court ruled that the search
was not incident to arrest solely because the search had been removed in time
from the arrest. 249 It is not clear how temporal proximity changes the legit-
imate expectation of privacy once the item already has been seized.
Furthermore, the Robinson Court's allowance of the search, when no
exigency justified it, is inconsistent with the Court's position that a "search
. . .must.., be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation." 250 Seizure alone often will serve the objectives of confiscation of
weapons and avoidance of the destruction of evidence. It was self-evident in
Robinson when the officer seized the cigarette package that the seizure re-
moved any possibility of the defendant's obtaining a weapon or destroying
any evidence contained therein.
Thus, the Court substantially departs from its expressed preference for
warrants by permitting a warrantless search when a seizure serves the objec-
tives of the exception. Allowance of this gratuitous search is a substantial
retreat from the Court's requirement that any warrantless search be circum-
scribed by "the exigencies of the situation [making] that course impera-
tive.'5
A further reason exists to doubt that a Court loyal to a warrant-prefer-
ence approach would permit an extensive search for evidence based solely on
probable cause to arrest: "There is always the possibility that a police officer,
lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a
pretext to conduct a search." 2 2 Because "in most jurisdictions and for most
traffic offenses the determination of whether to issue a citation or effect a full
246. Id. at 237-38 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
247. 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (footnote omitted).
248. Id. at 13-14 n.8.
249. Id. at 15.
250. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968).
251. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
252. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,248(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The potential for police
abuse is discussed below as an element of the Court's functional approach to automobile searches.
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arrest is discretionary with the officer," 2 53 it is extremely difficult for a court
to review effectively the legitimacy of any arrest. The coupling of arbitrary
police power with an extensive right to search the person of the arrestee is in
contravention of the Court's belief that the protection offered by the fourth
amendment is assured only when a neutral magistrate can evaluate the
reasonableness of any police search or seizure.254
As discussed earlier,255 limitation of police searches to a Terry frisk and
to seizure of objects found as a result thereof would eliminate much of the
problem. One commentator has suggested further that the Court "exclude
from evidence anything but a weapon found in a search incident to arrest for a
crime, such as a traffic violation, for which there existed no justification to
search for anything but a weapon." 256 To date, however, the Court has not
been receptive to this rule. 257
The second and more radical departure from a warrant-preference ap-
proach is the Belton Court's recent "bright-line" rule25 8 for the search of
containers found in an automobile incident to its occupant's arrest. Prior to
Belton the Court in Chimel had determined that the scope of a permissible
search of the area in which one is arrested extends only to "the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items." 59 Because application of this standard to searches of containers
found in a car produced diverse results in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court recognized the need for "'[a] single, familiar standard ... to guide
police officers.' ,260
Consistent with that need, the Court in Belton interpreted the Chimel
standard to include the passenger compartment of an automobile. 26' The
Court further held that "the police may also examine the contents of any
containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger
compartment is within the reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be
within his reach., 262 "Container" was defined as "denot[ing] any object
capable of holding another object"; 263 and thus included glove compartments
and luggage.264
Despite the Court's assertion in Belton that its conclusion "in no way
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the
253. Id.
254. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 244-51.
256. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma,
1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 156.
257. Id.
258. 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
260. 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
261. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
262. Id. (footnote omitted).
263. Id. n.4.
264. Id.
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basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests," 265 it is clear that
the formulation does a great deal more than merely "determine the meaning
of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context." 2(6 First,
the formulation does not distinguish between a container and its contents.2 67 If
one assumes (and it is a questionable assumption) that containers within the
passenger compartment are within the arrestee's immediate control, it does
not follow inexorably that their contents also are within his immediate con-
trol. The Court's interpretation is even more removed from any rational def-
inition of the Chimel standard because the Court's view of the area under the
arrestee's immediate control includes glove compartments (apparently locked
or not) and luggage. In addition, the search can be performed even after police
remove the occupant from the automobile.26
The Court's interpretation of the Chimel standard is a perverse extension
of any rational meaning of the words "area within one's immediate control";
this liberal interpretation is a retreat to the "constructive possession ' 2 69 ra-
tionale of Harris.270
Moreover, this formulation ignores the lesser intrusion engendered by
seizure of the container. 27' Because "searches of possessions within an ar-
restee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of
privacy caused by the arrest,, 272 little apparent reason exists for the Court to
hold as coexistent the permissible scope of a search of an automobile and
containers found therein pursuant to probable cause to arrest. 273 Absent prob-
able cause to believe that the container "contains some immediately danger-
ou nsrmetliy 274 or5ous instrumentality '  or absent an emergency,275 it is questionable why the
Court should permit a search when a less intrusive seizure of the container
would be sufficient to fulfill the objectives of the search. In Belton seizure of
the defendant's jacket served the officer's interests in securing his own safety
and in avoiding the destruction of evidence. 276 No justification (under a war-
rant-preference approach) exists for allowance of the warrantless search.
The broad interpretation adopted by the Court also contravenes its
earlier assertion in United States v. Chadwick277:
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. This distinction did not escape Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 17 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
268. 453 U.S. 454, 456 (1981).
269. 331 U.S. 145, 164 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 160-64.
271. Seizure of a container violates its owner's possessory interest; allowance ofan additional search ofthe
container further violates its owner's secrecy interest. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Auto-
mobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835, 840 (1974).
272. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977).
273. The propriety of a search of containers under the automobile exception will be discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 308-28.
274. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1977).
275. For example, if the police had reason to believe that safe transport of all containers to the police
station could not be achieved, an immediate search might be permissible.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
277. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property
not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive
control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the
property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no
longer an incident of the arrest. 278
If "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears," 279 it is difficult to understand how
the Court can, consistent with a warrant-preference approach to the fourth
amendment, formulate such an expansive exception that breaks so sharply
with prior doctrine. Because the seizure of containers found in an automobile,
rather than their immediate search, entails none of the severe administrative
burdens on police departments associated with a constitutional requirement
to seize an automobile, 280 no purpose consistent with a warrant-preference
approach could justify the broad exception adopted by the Court in Belton.
C. The Need for a More Functional Approach
The Court's departure from a warrant-preference approach is due to the
necessity for practical guidelines for police. The nature of law-enforcement
techniques and the infinitely varying situations in which police must apply
those techniques cannot always be reconciled with a requirement for a war-
rant.
Under a warrant-preference approach a court is faced constantly with a
hard choice 28' when reviewing the reasonableness of a warrantless auto-
mobile search-if the search was unreasonable, the court's ad hoc knowledge
of the defendant's guilt renders exclusion of the evidence exceedingly difficult
for the court to order. Thus, the court either must exclude the evidence seized
and, consequently, allow an apparently guilty defendant to go free, or some-
how fit the search within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The choice is especially hard when it is clear to the court that a warrant would
have been issued if it had been sought.282
The all-or-nothing dichotomy imposed on the courts by the exclusionary
rule creates pressure to expand the "few" 283 and "well-delineated" 284 excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. The resulting decisions often are tortured
interpretations of an exception's requirements. An example of the problem is
Chambers,285 in which the Court viewed the inherent mobility of the auto-
278. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
279. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
280. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n. 14 (1979). See also United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157, 2166 n.16 (1982).
281. This result primarily is due to the various interests, societal and individual, involved in the
determination whether a search should be considered within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
See generally Haddad, Well-delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1977).
282. Id.
283. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
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mobile as sufficient to meet the exigency requirement of the Carroll excep-
tion despite the automobile's presence at the police station and the slight
possibility that the car would be moved.286 Regardless of the Court's reluc-
tance to strike down a search that most likely would have been allowed if a
search warrant had been sought, this interpretation of the exigency require-
ment only dilutes its meaning and, consequently, leads to a broadening of the
exception.
287
The Court's reluctance to strictly adhere to a warrant requirement also is
due to its perception that in some cases that adherence will protect privacy
interests only marginally while imposing substantial costs on effective law
enforcement. In particular, the Court's allowance of a full search of the per-
son incident to arrest is reflective of this perception. The search incident to
arrest exception, while fulfilling law enforcement's "need to disarm the sus-
pect in order to take him into custody [and its] need to preserve evidence on
his person for later use at trial," ' 88 also has been justified on the ground "that
an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant
Fdurth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person." 28 9 Because of the
"legitimate and overriding governmental concern" 290 for the protection of the
officer and the avoidance of the destruction of evidence, "[n]o reason then
exists to frustrate law enforcement by requiring some independent justifica-
tion for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest." 29'
This comparison of law-enforcement costs and perceived marginal pri-
vacy interests also has been advanced as a justification for the Court's adop-
tion in Belton of a broad interpretation of the Chimel standard. The Court in
Robbins observed that "[a]ny 'bright line' rule does involve costs. Belton
trades marginal privacy of containers within the passenger area of an auto-
mobile for protection of the officer and of destructible evidence. The balance
of these interests strongly favors the Court's rule., 292
Finally, the Court's departure from a warrant-preference approach may
be attributable to its recognition of the disparate results obtainable by applica-
tion of the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest exception to
the same facts. The incongruity of such a possibility did not escape Justice
Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Robbins:
It is quite clear to most of us that this case and New York v. Belton
... should be decided in the same way. Both cases involve automobile searches.
In both cases, the automobiles had been lawfully stopped on the highway, the
occupants had been lawfully arrested, and the officers had probable cause to
believe that the vehicles contained contraband.293
286. Id.
287. Another example of this process is United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). See supra note 76.
288. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
289. Id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 431 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 444. Ross, of course, is a step toward uniformity of application of fourth amendment policies
under both the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest exception.
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Although it is not certain that the divergent holdings in Robbins and
Belton were predicated solely on the difference in theories argued,294 the
Robbins Court expressly noted that "[i]n particular, it has not [been] argued
that the opening of the packages was incident to a lawful custodial arrest." 
2 95
It is difficult to see any rational distinction between Belton and Robbins other
than the separate exception theories under which each was argued. Distin-
guishing between the relative privacy interests of a plastic package and a
jacket pocket is tenuous at best.296 In addition, any distinction between the
passenger compartment and the trunk of a car also would be irrational once
the arrest has occurred. Thus, because divergent and irrational results are
possible when courts can apply overlapping2 97 exceptions to the same facts,
the Court may feel compelled to move toward a more uniform analytical
framework.98
V. THE IMPLICIT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION IN
VARIOUS CONTEXTS
If the Court indeed has moved away from a warrant-preference approach
to automobile search and seizure cases, upon what implicit analytical course
has it embarked? This Comment takes the position that the Court has chosen
a course of analysis more cognizant of the competing interests present in all
automobile searches and that it has engaged in a balancing of those interests.
The Court's movement toward a more uniform analytical framework has
been compelled by certain societal and individual interests present in all
automobile searches: the government's interest in efficient law enforce-
ment 299 and the individual's interest in his privacy.3 0' Utilizing several con-
siderations, the Court has sought to resolve the cases before it in a manner
most consistent with the importance of these two interests.
The more functional approach to automobile searches attempts to re-
concile the practical realities of effective law enforcement with the values of
personal autonomy and privacy rather than to strictly adhere to a warrant
requirement. Under the functional approach the Court first will look to the
benefits to society of the practice employed by the police in their efforts to
294. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35 & 46-48.
295. 453 U.S. 420, 429 n.3 (1981).
296. Justice Stevens remarked that this distinction would be a "curious conclusion." Id. at 444 n. 1 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
297. For an excellent discussion of the degree to which the automobile exception and the search incident to
arrest exception apply to and overlap in the same factual circumstances, see Moylan, The Automobile Excep-
tion: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987,
1012-22 (1976).
298. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), in which the Court used a quasi-Belton standard in an
automobile exception case (in terms of the permissible scope of the search), is evidence of this movement.
299. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
153 (1925).
300. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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"ferre[t] out crime." ' ' There are two major benefits: effective law enforce-
ment 302 and avoidance of excessive administrative burdens.
30 3
Administrative burdens, for purposes of this Comment, are only those
additional burdens that a warrant requirement would impose on police. For
instance, when the normal police procedure would be to seize the automobile
anyway, a requirement that a warrant be obtained prior to a search would not
impose any significant burden on police departments. As a matter of constitu-
tional policy, then, the Court should be concerned only with those require-
ments that impose burdens beyond the normal police procedure.
The Court then will weigh the benefits against the detriments the practice
may impose-the degree of infringement of individual privacy interests 3°4 and
the potential for abuse of the practice305-and against any less intrusive yet
comparably efficient alternatives. 3°
If the benefits substantially outweigh the detriments or alternatives, the
Court will uphold the practice. If the benefits equal the detriments, or espe-
cially if a less intrusive yet comparably efficient alternative exists, the Court
will strike down the practice. 3°7 Application of this more functional approach
in various contexts will reveal a greater degree of coherence in the Court's
decisions.
A. Search of the Automobile Versus Search of Containers Found Within the
Automobile
Despite Chief Justice Burger's assertion that one should view differently
the search of luggage as part of the general search of the car compared with a
specific search of luggage as "the suspected locus of the contraband,- 30 3
application of the more functional analytical framework reveals similar reso-
lutions to the two searches.
301. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
302. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
303. This concern was noted by the Court in Sanders when it stated that "[tihe difficulties in seizing and
securing automobiles have led the Court to make special allowances for their search," 442 U.S. 753, 763 n. 10
(1979), and further that "[s]uch a constitutional requirement [to seize rather than search an automobile] there-
fore would have imposed severe, even impossible, burdens on many police departments." Id. at 765-66 n. 14.
304. In both Chadwick and Sanders the Court distinguished between the search of an automobile and the
search of any luggage contained therein by their relative privacy interests, the luggage being characterized as
having a greater privacy interest. See supra text accompanying notes 110-37. Under Ross, however, those
distinctions apparently are irrelevant, unless the locus of probable cause is a specific container. United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1982).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53. For an excellent discussion of this potential problem, see
LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
SUP. CT. REV. 127.
306. In Chadwick the Court struck down the search of the luggage because "[tihe initial seizure and
detention of the footlocker ... [was] sufficient to guard against any risk that evidence might be lost.'" 433 U.S.
1, 13 (1977). See also Justice Marshall's assertion in Ross that seizure alone of containers found within an
automobile will efficiently serve law enforcement objectives. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2176 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
307. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) (upholding the search); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977) (striking down the search).
308. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 767 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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In most cases an immediate search of the automobile clearly will be
instrumental in both furthering the goal of effective law enforcement and
avoiding excessive administrative burdens through the imposition of a re-
quirement to seize the automobile. Avoidance of excessive administrative
burdens was recognized expressly by the Sanders Court: "The difficulties in
seizing and securing automobiles have led the Court to make special allow-
ances for their search.
' 309
No such difficulties, however, attend luggage or containers found within
the automobile. The Sanders Court, in discussing the rationale for the
Chambers search, noted:
In Chambers, if the Court had required seizure and holding of the vehicle, it would
have imposed a constitutional requirement upon police departments of all sizes
around the country to have available the people and equipment necessary to
transport impounded automobiles to some central location until warrants could be
secured.... Such a constitutional requirement therefore would have imposed
severe, even impossible, burdens on many police departments.... No compar-
able burdens are likely to exist with respect to the seizure of personal luggage. 31
0
Furthermore, the Robbins Court held that "[w]hile both cars and luggage may
be 'mobile,' luggage itself may be brought and kept under the control of
police. ' 3ll
Thus, the lack of excessive administrative burdens coupled with the
existence of a less intrusive yet comparably efficient alternative-seizure
rather than search-serves as a rational point of distinction between auto-
mobiles and luggage or containers found within those automobiles. Reliance
on this distinction is more sensible than any distinction between the relative
privacy interests of containers found in an automobile and the automobile's
glove compartment or trunk.312
Reliance on an administrative burden-efficient alternative distinction also
eliminates any possible reason to distinguish various types of containers ac-
cording to their relative privacy interests. As the Robbins Court noticed,
-[E]ven if one wished to import such a distinction into the Fourth Amend-
ment, it is difficult if not impossible to perceive any objective criteria by
which that task might be accomplished., 313 The distinction would reduce
one's constitutional protections to a function of his economic means.1 4
Thus, reliance on a warrant requirement based on privacy concepts is
unnecessary to justify the separate treatment of automobiles and containers
found therein. Instead, courts can find justification in the separate administra-
tive burden and less intrusive alternative concepts. An exception to this dis-
tinction, however, should be recognized whenever there is an emergency or a
309. Id. at 763 n.10.
310. Id. at 765-66 n. 14.
311. 453 U.S. 420, 424 (1981).
312. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
313. 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981).
314. "What one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag." Id. The Ross Court has
reaffirmed the Robbins Court's rejection of an unworthy container rule. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157,
2171 (1982).
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reasonable suspicion that the container contains an inherently dangerous ob-
ject 35 (such as a bomb), thus justifying an immediate search.
The automobile-container dichotomy should be maintained for fourth
amendment purposes despite the Ross Court's assertion that no administra-
tive burden distinction can be made between containers and automobiles.3 6
Indeed, the Court's treatment in Ross of Chadwick and Sanders undermines
its argument that "until the container itself was opened the police could never
be certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion
of the vehicle; thus, in every case in which a container was found, the vehicle
would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained."- 317
The logic of this statement is inconsistent with the Court's retention of a
distinction between a Ross search and a Chadwick-Sanders search. In partic-
ular, the Court argued that "[a] temporary seizure of a package or piece of
luggage often may be accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon
the individual-and without as great a burden on the police-as in the case of
the seizure of an automobile.", 318 In its discussion of Sanders3 t 9 the Ross
Court further emphasized that "[m]oreover, none of the practical difficulties
associated with the detention of a vehicle on a public highway that made the
immediate search in Carroll reasonable could justify an immediate search of
the suitcase, since the officers had no interest in detaining the taxi or its
driver. 32
Thus, to be consistent internally, the majority opinion in Ross apparently
is drawing a distinction between those cases in which the locus of probable
cause is the automobile in general32' and those in which the locus of probable
cause is a specific container. 32 2 Besides producing absurd results, 323 this dis-
tinction is inconsistent with the underlying assumption of the Ross Court
majority opinion that until a container is searched, the automobile from which
it was removed is imbued somehow with a latent sense of probable cause that
becomes more concrete as each container fails to reveal the suspected contra-
band.324
If, as the Court implies, the absence of evidence creates probable cause
to find it elsewhere (a curious notion), then certainly a seizure of the auto-
315. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 n.9 (1977).
316. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 n.28 (1982).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 2166 n.16.
319. For a description of the facts of Sanders, see supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
320. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2166 n.18 (1982).
321. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
322. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
323. To illustrate the absurdity: If police are tipped by a reliable informant that an individual is carrying
drugs inside a suitcase within the trunk of his car, the allowance of an immediate search will depend on the
contents of the trunk. If the trunk contains several suitcases, Ross would permit an immediate search; if,
however, police found only one suitcase, Chadwick and Sanders prohibit an immediate search because the locus
of probable cause is a single container. Thus Justice Marshall's assertion that "[s]urely the protection of the
warrant requirement cannot depend on a numerical count of the items subject to search." United States v. Ross,
102 S. Ct. 2157, 2180 n.10 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
324. See supra text accompanying note 317.
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mobile also would be required in a Chadwick-Sanders search. Consequently,
the retention of a distinction between Ross and Chadwick-Sanders under-
mines the basic premise of Ross -avoidance of excessive administrative
burdens on police departments. 3"- Moreover, the majority opinion in Ross
fails to explain why seizure of containers cannot be accomplished after a
thorough search of the automobile-the search would obviate any possibility
that probable cause to search the automobile will arise upon the absence of
contraband in the containers. Although the functional approach allows for a
distinction in treatment of containers and automobiles based on the differ-
ences in administrative burdens, the Court's retention of a dichotomy be-
tween Ross and Chadwick-Sanders only creates confusion and undercuts the
validity of this distinction.
It also is noteworthy that the Ross Court did not explicitly address the
potential police abuse of a Ross search. Apparently, the Court considers the
ad hoc determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate 326 to be a
sufficient safeguard.327 Justice Marshall correctly pointed out that the in-
herent purpose of a prior determination of probable cause by a neutral mag-
istrate is the avoidance of police abuse.328
This functional approach also cannot justify the broad rule adopted by
the Court in Belton. There seems to be no rational explanation of the broad,
all-inclusive exception save the simplicity of application, yet surely a blanket
requirement of a seizure also meets this goal. Although the more functional
approach may explain more coherently the direction the Court has taken in
automobile search and seizure cases, because of the various weights each
Justice may assign to the competing interests it cannot explain every holding
by the Court.
B. Search and Seizure of the Person in the Automobile
Under Robinson a full search of the person of the arrestee is permitted.3 29
Because the reasonableness of the search is based on a functional presump-
tion of exigency,- it is not clear how the search, consistent with a warrant-
preference approach, can exceed the protective scope of a Terry frisk. 33 ' That
type of search, however, is more readily explainable under a functional ap-
proach.
In furthering the goals of disarming the suspect in order to take him into
custody and preserving evidence on his person for later use at trial, a full
search provides a benefit to society through effective law enforcement. It is
325. Id.
326. It is questionable how neutral a magistrate can be once the evidence showing that the defendant is
actually guilty has been produced.
327. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
328. Id. at 2175 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying note 209.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 192-99.
330. See supra text accompanying note 238.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 242-43.
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not clear, however, that courts would impose any excessive administrative
burden by limiting the search to a Terry frisk and to seizure of any objects
discovered on the arrestee's person.
Still, under the Court's perception that "[t]he danger to an officer is far
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case
of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop, '
32
the Court may choose to disregard the potentially negligible administrative-
burdens limitation that a Terry frisk would impose. Furthermore, because of
the Court's belief that a full search is necessary to eliminate the "far greater"
danger it perceives, the less intrusive alternative of a Terry frisk coupled with
seizure of any objects found would be (to the Court) a less efficient safeguard
for police.
As a consequence of the Court's perception, distinguishing a weapons-
motive search from an evidence-motive search is pointless because a full
search for weapons necessarily will render any evidence found subject to the
plain view 333 exception.
The point of dissension between the majority and the dissent in Robinson
centered on the detriments of allowing a full search. Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion asserted that once a person is arrested, he "retains no
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person. ,
314
Justice Marshall, while recognizing that the Court had to balance "the indi-
vidual's interest in remaining free from unnecessarily intrusive invasions of
privacy and society's interest that police officers not take unnecessary risks in
the performance of their duties,"3 35 chose not to resolve the issue on that
ground.336 Instead, Justice Marshall argued that no justification existed for the
search of the cigarette pack after its seizure.337 Justice Rehnquist, in writing
the majority opinion, responded that "[a] police officer's determination as to
how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the
search." 338
Thus, a major point of contention in Robinson between the Justices with-
in this functional approach was the relative merits of the benefit to effective
law enforcement by allowing a full search versus the protection of individual
privacy interests by insisting on a less intrusive alternative. Therefore, deter-
332. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
333. See supra note 92.
334. 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
335. Id. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 256. Justice Marshall evidently resolved the issue on the existence of a comparably efficient
alternative. See supra text accompanying notes 301-06.
338. 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
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mination of an issue within the functional approach framework can turn on the
Court's perception of the relative merits of the interests asserted.
A further point of contention within this framework in Robinson was the
potential for abuse of the practice. Justice Marshall voiced his concern that
allowing a full search could lead to a "pretext arrest ' 3 9 in traffic arrests.
Because the defendant in Robinson had been arrested lawfully 34 the Robin-
son majority merely stated that it would "leave for another day questions
which would arise on facts different from these." 341 Within the functional
approach framework, then, the Court has asserted that because of the large
benefit to society that a full search confers through its contribution to effec-
tive law enforcement, it would permit the practice despite the possible exist-
ence of a less intrusive yet comparably efficient alternative and the potential
abuse of the practice through the pretext arrest.
C. The Chambers-Type Search
The Court's decision in Chambers to permit a warrantless search of an
automobile at the police station when the Carroll rule would have permitted
the search at the scene of the arrest is reflective of the value judgments the
Court will incorporate into the calculus of this functional approach. The deci-
sion clearly falls outside a warrant-preference approach because under the
facts of the case3 42 the search failed to meet the exigency requirement of the
Carroll exception. Justice White's tenuous assertion that "It]he probable-
cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the
car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and
the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured' 343 was a shaky
reliance on the inherent mobility of the automobile to meet the exigency
requirement.
In striking down the search in Coolidge,34 the Court expressly rejected
inherent mobility as sufficient to meet the Carroll exigency requirement:
In this case, it is, of course, true that even though Coolidge was injail, his wife was
miles away in the company of two plainclothesmen, and the Coolidge property
was under the guard of two other officers, the automobile was in a literal sense
-mobile." A person who had the keys and could slip by the guard could drive it
away. We attach no constitutional significance to this sort of mobility. 345
Thus, Chambers cannot be reconciled rationally with a warrant-preference
approach.
339. Id. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
340. 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.l (1973).
341. Id.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
343. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 82-94.
345. 403 U.S. 443, 461 n.18 (1971).
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Under a functional approach the decision makes more sense. Although
arguably little additional administrative burden exists in requiring a seizure
until a warrant is procured,34 there is a benefit to effective law enforcement
by allowing an immediate search.
Furthermore, the potential for police abuse of later searches is minimal
because a prior Carroll search must be justified before the later search will be
permitted.347 The Chambers Court thus saw little reason to impose a formal-
istic exercise when search warrants would be issued in the vast majority of
cases.
The Chambers Court was undecided on the degree of invasion of privacy
interests that an immediate search would pose; in essence, it viewed an im-
mediate search as "debatably ' 348 equivalent to a continued seizure in its
relative invasion of privacy interests. In this process of weighing the detri-
ments of the police practice Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority. In
reviewing the degree of privacy interest invasion, he argued that "the lesser
intrusion will almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period
.. necessary to enable the officer to obtain a search warrant.,
349
Justice Harlan also condemned the police practice because of the exist-
ence of a less intrusive alternative-seizure and detention of the automobile
until a search warrant could be obtained, unless the occupant consented to an
immediate search. 350 This alternative would permit the occupant of the auto-
mobile to determine for himself which is the lesser or greater intrusion. Al-
though the majority did not respond to this argument, they may have felt that
this alternative was not comparably efficient because of the greater expendi-
ture in police time and effort.35" '
VI. POLICE GUIDELINES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
A review of the development of the law in automobile searches clearly
shows that this development has not been loyal to a warrant-preference ap-
proach. The Court's recognition of the necessity of reconciling effective law-
enforcement needs with an expressed judicial approach to the fourth amend-
ment has forced the Supreme Court to expand the warrant requirement excep-
tions to the point that the requirement has lost much of its efficacy.
346. Despite the Sanders Court's assertion that the Chambers Court did not want to impose a requirement
on police departments to seize an automobile, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n. 14 (1979), the issue of this imposition was not
before the Chambers Court. In Chambers the police voluntarily had seized the vehicle without any prior
requirement to do so. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. Thus, the issue before the Chambers Court
was, given the initial seizure and given that a Carroll search would have been permissible, whether the police
were under a requirement to continue that seizure until a warrant was procured. The difference in administrative
burdens is obvious. See also supra text between notes 303 & 304.
347. As discussed earlier, under the functional approach, administrative convenience will, in most cases,
justify the initial search unless the normal police procedure is to seize the automobile anyway. See supra text
accompanying notes 303-04.
348. 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
349. Id. at 63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
350. Id. at 64.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 287-92.
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The Court's ambiguous adherence to a warrant-preference approach,
rendered all the more inarticulable by the expansion of the meaning of
exigency 352 and the introduction of inapplicable concepts of privacy, 353 is in
contravention of the principle that
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus
ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the
context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort
of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but
they may be "literally impossible of application by the officer in the field." 354
A further incongruity in this approach consists of the divergent results obtain-
able by application of different exception theories to similar facts.355
These weaknesses are not attendant to the more functional approach
under which this Comment asserts the Court implicitly has been operating.
This approach recognizes the competing interests present in all automobile
searches and has the advantage of incorporating consideration of all these
searches into a single analytical framework.356
A. Search of the Automobile
The allowance of a warrantless search of an automobile pursuant to the
automobile exception or to the search incident to arrest exception is a re-
sponse by the Court to the difficulty of seizing and securing automobiles.357
The guidelines that the Court has formulated for this search under the Court's
asserted warrant-preference approach are indeterminate because of the
%ourt's ambiguous acinere ice to the requirement of exigency and the re-
quirement of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 58
Under the functional approach the general rule for searches of auto-
mobiles, subject to several exceptions, is simple: when the police have prob-
able cause 359 to search the automobile, a full search of the automobile is
permissible. This general search, however, does not extend necessarily to any
containers found within the automobile; searches of containers are subject to
a different rule.3"
352. See supra text accompanying notes 213-17.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 221-32.
354. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication"
Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 127, 141).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 292-98.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 301-06.
357. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 n.10 (1979).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 213-32.
359. In search incident to arrest cases probable cause to search is presumed, to assure the officer's safety.
This presumption, however, also is subject to the exceptions to the general rule. See infra text accompanying
notes 360 & 364. Furthermore, the presumption does not exist for those arrests, such as a traffic violation, for
which no evidence is required. This limitation will eliminate the possibility of pretext arrests.
360. See infra subpart VI(C).
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Although no significant difference exists between the privacy interests of
an automobile and a container found therein,3 6' allowing the warrantless
search of the automobile when an accompanying warrantless search of a
container found therein would be impermissible is grounded in the different
administrative burden posed by a requirement to seize rather than search. The
Court in Arkansas v. Sanders3 62 noted that recognition of a requirement to
seize rather than search the automobile "would have imposed severe, even
impossible, burdens on many police departments." 363 Because a requirement
of seizure would create such an excessive administrative burden, it would not
be a comparably efficient alternative to an immediate search. Furthermore,
because the police must have probable cause to search, the potential for abuse
is minimal.
This general rule, however, ceases to be operative when the requirement
to seize the automobile would not impose an excessive administrative burden
on police departments. In particular, when the standard police procedure is to
seize the automobile, a constitutional requirement to do so imposes no addi-
tional administrative burden.364 The most common example of this standard
procedure is the seizure of the automobile pursuant to the arrest of its occu-
pants. Thus, in most instances in which probable cause to arrest exists before
any search is initiated, and when the standard police procedure is to seize the
automobile, the courts should disallow an immediate search.
When probable cause to arrest the occupants of the car arises during the
search, however, the search should be permitted to continue. In addition, the
requirement to seize when the seizure does not create excessive administra-
tive burdens for police is subject to several exceptions. The first exception
arises when the object seized from the automobile is in plain view. That
seizure does not violate any reasonable privacy interest of the arrestee (or
potential arrestee). In the absence of any indication that the discovery was not
inadvertent,365 problems of potential police abuse are minimal.
A second exception to the requirement of seizure arises when the police
have a reasonable suspicion that the automobile contains an inherently
dangerous object, such as a bomb. The need to insure the officer's safety is
sufficiently important to outweigh the privacy interest the arrestee has in the
automobile. Again, because reasonable suspicion that an inherently danger-
ous object exists is required, there is little danger of police abuse.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 228-32. Indeed, the Ross Court firmly stated its understanding
that "the privacy interests in acar's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those in a moveable
container." United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1982).
362. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
363. Id. at 765-66 n. 14.
364. For example, the police in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), probably would have impounded
the automobile as a standard procedure pursuant to a custodial arrest. Conversely, in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), the police would not have arrested the defendants or seized their automobile until after the
search revealed the incriminating evidence. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2178 n.6 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
365. See supra note 92.
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A final exception to the requirement of seizure is the existence of an
emergency that renders the standardized police seizure impractical. The
Court in Belton alluded to this consideration when it emphasized that when
the lone officer searched the defendant's jacket he was on a deserted highway
with four defendants standing nearby.366
B. Search of the Person
The permissible scope of the search of the person as incident to the
search of the automobile is contingent on the existence of probable cause to
arrest. When the search essentially is a Carroll automobile exception, for
example, when no probable cause to arrest arises until after a search is ini-
tiated or completed, only a Terry frisk should be allowed.367
When the encounter concerns an arrest, the interest in assuring the
officer's safety requires a more extensive Robinson search. 368 Because of the
arrestee's continuing privacy interest in his personal possessions 369 and the
need to avoid police abuse through a pretext arrest, 370 however, the search
should be limited to seizure of any items found on the person of the arrestee.
As in the seizure requirement for automobiles, the requirement to seize
items from the person of the arrestee is subject to the exceptions of plain
view, reasonable suspicion that the object seized is inherently dangerous, and
the existence of an emergency that renders mere seizure impractical. Absent
probable cause to arrest, any search beyond a Terry frisk would require
probable cause to believe that the occupant had destructible evidence on his
person.
C. Search of Containers Found Within the Automobile
As noted by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Arkansas v.
Sanders,37' a distinction should be made between those searches in which the
locus of probable cause is a particular piece of luggage or a particular con-
tainer and those in which the locus of probable cause is the automobile in
general. 372 Because the functional approach considers the potential for
abuse,373 it is logical to require those police investigations that have focused
on a particular container to be limited in scope to that container.3 74 Thus, a
366. 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (quoting People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 454, 407 N.E.2d 420, 424, 429
N.Y.S.2d 574, 578 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting)).
367. See supra note 185.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 192-99.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 247-48.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
371. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
372. Id. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Ross Court apparently adopted this position. See supra text
accompanying notes 316-22.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 301-06.
374. The Ross Court agreed with this limitation. "Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the
trunk of a taxi contains contraband orevidence does not justify a search of the entire cab." 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172
(1982). Of course, if, by the defendant's actions prior to the search or by some other source, probable cause to
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specific investigation such as that at issue in United States v. Chadwick375 or
Arkansas v. Sanders37 6 should not, in the absence of probable cause, become
a general investigation solely because of the presence of an automobile.
The interest in effective law enforcement is circumscribed by the locus of
probable cause, which also indicates the boundaries beyond which the poten-
tial for police abuse becomes more realistic. Reconciliation of the need for
effective law enforcement with the protection of individual privacy interests
and the avoidance of police abuse also circumscribes the limits of police
action for those containers within the permissible scope of police investiga-
tion. As a consequence, the proper course of police action (whether the
investigation is general or specific) is seizure of the container until a warrant
can be obtained to search it.
Seizure fulfills the interest in effective law enforcement because it de-
prives the arrestee of any potential weapon or evidence in the container. If no
probable cause exists to arrest, seizure still will serve the law enforcement
objective of preserving evidence. Analogous to Justice Harlan's observation
in Chambers v. Maroney,377 the occupant of the automobile always can con-
sent to an immediate search.378
Although the requirement of seizure will create some administrative
burdens for police departments, this concern is outweighed by the protection
the requirement affords, both to the secrecy aspect of a person's privacy
interest and to the avoidance of police abuse, by interposing a neutral magis-
trate's judgment between the seizure and the search.
The requirement of seizure, however, is subject to several exceptions.
These exceptions are in response to situations in which it is either unneces-
sary or impractical to impose the requirement of seizure. As in the search of
the automobile and of the person, these exceptions arise when the object is in
plain view, when a reasonable suspicion exists that the container conceals
an inherently dangerous substance, and when an emergency makes mere
seizure impractical.
An emergency may be found when there are too many containers for the
officer to handle safely while trying to control the actions of the artestee. An
emergency also may be found when the container simply cannot be seized,
because it is either too large or too heavy.
Under the functional approach inquiry into the relative privacy interests
of various containers is unnecessary. Thus, it has the advantage of removing
such an ambiguous criterion from the decision-making process of police.
believe the evidence or contraband sought has been removed from the original point of suspicion, the locus of
probable cause can become general, embracing the whole automobile. Thus, the police standard of conduct
would be governed by the standard for a general search. See supra subpart VI(A).
375. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
376. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
377. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
378. Id. at 64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Furthermore, the removal of the reasonable expectation of privacy test as a
standard for police obviates the possibility that protection under the fourth
amendment will become a function of economic means.
The requirement of seizure of the container also serves the need for
relatively clear guidelines for police. Moreover, because it serves police ob-
jectives of assuring the officer's safety and avoiding the destruction of ev-
idence, the requirement of seizure meets the functional-approach goal of
effective law enforcement. Finally, because the requirement of seizure places
a neutral magistrate's judgment between the seizure and the search, it serves
the functional-approach goals of protecting individual privacy rights and
avoiding police abuse.
VII. CONCLUSION
The functional approach explains the history of automobile search and
seizure cases more coherently than the Court's expressed warrant-preference
approach. 379 Furthermore, the functional approach has the advantage of ef-
ficiently reconciling the practical realities of effective law enforcement with
the need to protect individual privacy rights. Because the process of judicial
analysis is not necessarily coexistent with that of the police decision-making
process, the functional approach also provides the judiciary with the tools to
propose clear standards for police in automobile search and seizure cases.
William M. Phillips
379. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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